Abstract-This paper presents TumbleBit, a new unidirectional unlinkable payment hub that is fully compatible with today's Bitcoin protocol. TumbleBit allows parties to make fast, anonymous, off-blockchain payments through an untrusted intermediary called the Tumbler. TumbleBit's anonymity properties are similar to classic Chaumian eCash: no one, not even the Tumbler, can link a payment from its payer to its payee. Every payment made via TumbleBit is backed by bitcoins, and comes with a guarantee that Tumbler can neither violate anonymity, nor steal bitcoins, nor "print money" by issuing payments to itself. We prove the security of TumbleBit using the real/ideal world paradigm and the random oracle model. Security follows from the standard RSA assumption and ECDSA unforgeability. We implement TumbleBit, mix payments from 800 users and show that TumbleBit's offblockchain payments can complete in seconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
One reason for Bitcoin's initial popularity was the perception of anonymity. Today, however, the sheen of anonymity has all but worn off, dulled by a stream of academic papers [37] , [49] , and a blockchain surveillance industry [31] , [26] , that have demonstrated weaknesses in Bitcoin's anonymity properties. As a result, a new market of anonymity-enhancing services has emerged [43] , [22] , [39] , [1] ; for instance, 1 million USD in bitcoins are funneled through JoinMarket each month [43] . These services promise to mix bitcoins from a set of payers (aka, input Bitcoin addresses A) to a set of payees (aka, output bitcoin addresses B) in a manner that makes it difficult to determine which payer transferred bitcoins to which payee.
To deliver on this promise, anonymity must also be provided in the face of the anonymity-enhancing service itself-if the service knows exactly which payer is paying which payee, then a compromise of the service leads to a total loss of anonymity. Compromise of anonymity-enhancing technologies is not unknown. In 2016, for example, researchers found more than 100 Tor nodes snooping on their users [45] . Moreover, users of mix services must also contend with the potential risk of "exit scams", where an established business takes in new payments but stops providing services. Exit scams have been known to occur in the Bitcoin world. In 2015, a Darknet Marketplace stole 11.7M dollars worth of escrowed customer bitcoins [51] , while btcmixers.com mentions eight different scam mix services. Thus, it is crucial that anonymity-enhancing services be designed in a manner that prevents bitcoin theft.
TumbleBit: An unlinkable payment hub. We present TumbleBit 1 , a unidirectional unlinkable payment hub that uses an untrusted intermediary, the Tumbler T , to enhance anonymity. Every payment made via TumbleBit is backed by bitcoins. We use cryptographic techniques to guarantee Tumbler T can neither violate anonymity, nor steal bitcoins, nor "print money" by issuing payments to itself. TumbleBit allows a payer Alice A to send fast off-blockchain payments (of denomination one bitcoin) to a set of payees (B 1 , ..., B Q ) of her choice. Because payments are performed off the blockchain, TumbleBit also serves to scale the volume and velocity of bitcoin-backed payments. Today, on-blockchain bitcoin transactions suffer a latency of ≈ 10 minutes. Meanwhile, TumbleBit payments are sent off-blockchain, via the Tumbler T , and complete in seconds. (Our implementation completed a payment in 1.2 seconds, on average, when T was in New York and A and B were in Boston.)
TumbleBit Overview.
TumbleBit replaces onblockchain payments with off-blockchain puzzle solving, where Alice A pays Bob B by providing B with the solution to a puzzle. The puzzle z is generated through interaction between B and T , and solved through an interaction between A and T . Each time a puzzle is solved, 1 bitcoin is transferred from Alice A to the Tumbler T and finally on to Bob B.
The protocol proceeds in three phases; see Figure 1 . In the on-blockchain Escrow Phase, each payer Alice A opens a payment channel with the Tumbler T by escrowing Q bitcoins on the blockchain. Each payee Bob B also opens a channel with T . This involves (1) T escrowing Q bitcoins on the blockchain, and (2) B and T engaging in a puzzle-promise protocol that generates up to Q puzzles for B. During the offblockchain Payment Phase, each payer Alice A makes up to Q off-blockchain payments to any set of payees. To make a payment, A interacts with T to learn the solution to a puzzle B provided. Finally, the CashOut Phase closes all payment channels. Each payee B uses his Q solved puzzles (aka, TumbleBit payments) to create an on-blockchain transaction that claims Q bitcoins from T 's escrow. Each payer A also closes her escrow with T , recovering bitcoins not used in a payment.
Anonymity properties. TumbleBit provides unlinkability: Given the set of escrow transactions and the set of cash-out transactions, we define a valid configuration as a set of payments that explains the transfer of funds from Escrow to Cash-Out. Unlinkability ensures that even the Tumbler T cannot distinguish the true configuration (i.e., the set of payments actually sent during the Payment Phase) from any other valid configuration.
TumbleBit is therefore similar to classic Chaumian eCash [16] . With Chaumian eCash, a payee A first withdraws an eCash coin in exchange for money (e.g., USD) at an intermediary Bank, then uses the coin to pay a payee B. Finally B redeems the eCash coin to the Bank in exchange for money. Unlinkability ensures that no party, not even the Bank can link the withdrawal of an eCash coin to the redemption of that coin. TumbleBit also provides unlinkability, with Tumbler T playing the role of the Chaumian Bank. However, while Tumbler T need not be trusted, the Chaumian Bank is trusted to not (1) "print money" (i.e., issue eCash to itself) or (2) steal money (i.e., refuse to exchange eCash coins for money).
TumbleBit: Also a classic tumbler. TumbleBit can also be used as a classic Bitcoin tumbler, mixing together the transfer of one bitcoin from each of ℵ distinct payers (Alice A) to ℵ distinct payees (Bob B). In this mode, TumbleBit is run as in Figure 1 with the payment phase shrunk to 30 seconds, so the protocol runs in epochs that require two blocks added to the blockchain. As a classic tumbler, TumbleBit provides k-anonymity within an epoch-no one, not even the Tumbler T , can link one of the k transfers that were successfully completed during the epoch to a specific pair of payer and payee (A, B).
RSA-puzzle solving. At the core of TumbleBit is our new "RSA puzzle solver" protocol that may be of independent interest. This protocol allows Alice A to pay one bitcoin to T in fair exchange 2 for an RSA exponentiation of a "puzzle" value z under T 's secret key. Fair exchange prevents a cheating T from claiming A's bitcoin without solving the puzzle. Our protocol is interesting because it is fast-solving 2048-bit RSA puzzles faster than [36] 's fair-exchange protocol for solving 16x16 Sudoku puzzles (Section VIII))-and because it supports RSA. The use of RSA means that blinding can be used to break the link between the user providing the puzzle (i.e., Bob B) and the user requesting its solution (e.g., payer Alice A).
Cryptographic protocols.
TumbleBit is realized by interleaving the RSA-puzzle-solver protocol with another fair-exchange puzzle-promise protocol. We formally prove that each protocol is a fair exchange. Our proofs use the real/ideal paradigm in the random oracle model (ROM) and security relies on the standard RSA assumption and the unforgeability of ECDSA signatures.
A. TumbleBit Features
Bitcoin compatibility. TumbleBit is fully compatible with today's Bitcoin protocol. To do this, we developed (off-blockchain) cryptographic protocols that work with the very limited set of (on-blockchain) instructions provided by today's Bitcoin scripts. Bitcoin scripts can only be used to perform two cryptographic operations: (1) validate the preimage of a hash, or (2) validate an ECDSA signature on a Bitcoin transaction. The limited functionality of Bitcoin scripts is likely here to stay; indeed, the recent "DAO" theft [3] has highlighted the inherent security risks of Ethereum's more complex scripting functionalities.
No coordination. In contrast to earlier work [34] , [50] , if Alice A wants to pay Bob B, she need not interact with any other TumbleBit users. Instead, A and B need only interact with the Tumbler and each other. This lack of coordination between TumbleBit users makes it possible to scale our system. Our implementation has been used to tumble payments from 800 users.
Performance. We have implemented our TumbleBit system in C++ and python, using LibreSSL as our cryptographic library. We have tumbled payments from 800 payers to 800 payees; the relevant transactions are visible on the blockchain. (See Section VIII-C).Our protocol requires 327 KB of data on the wire, and 0.6 seconds of computation on a single CPU. Thus, performance in classic tumbler mode is limited only by the time it takes for two blocks to be confirmed on the blockchain and the time it takes for transactions to be confirmed; currently, this takes ≈ 20 minutes. Meanwhile, off-blockchain payments can complete in seconds (Section VIII).
Scheme Prevents Theft Anonymous Resists DoS Resists Sybils Minimum Mixing Time Bitcoin Compatible No Coordination?
Coinjoin [34] small set × × 1 block × Coinshuffle [50] , [41] small set × × 1 block × (p2p network) Coinparty [56] 2/3 users honest some 1 (fees) 2 blocks × XIM [12] (fees) hours × (uses blockchain) Mixcoin [14] TTP accountable × (TTP) (fees) 2 blocks Blindcoin [55] TTP accountable (fees) 2 blocks CoinSwap [35] × (TTP) 2 (fees) 2 blocks BSC [25] (fees) 3 blocks × TumbleBit (fees) 2 blocks 1 COINPARTY COULD ACHIEVE SOME DOS RESISTANCE BY FORCING PARTIES TO SOLVE PUZZLES BEFORE PARTICIPATING.
B. Related Work
TumbleBit is related to work proposing new anonymous cryptocurrencies (e.g., Zerocash [40] , [9] or Monero [2] ). While this research direction is very promising, it has yet to be widely adopted by users and it is unclear whether these can be scalable solutions. TumbleBit is an anonymity service for Bitcoin's existing user base.
Off-blockchain payments. When used as an unlinkable payment hub, TumbleBit is related to off-blockchain micropayment channel networks, notably Duplex Micropayment Channels [17] and the Lightning Network [47] . These systems also allow for Bitcoin-backed fast offblockchain payments. Payments are sent via paths of intermediaries that have pre-established pairwise escrow transactions on the blockchain. TumbleBit (conceptually) does the same. However, while TumbleBit's intermediary (the Tumbler T ) cannot link a payment from A to B, the intermediaries in a micropayment channel network can link payments from A to B, thus we achieve much stronger anonymity.
[25] proposes a protocol that adds anonymity to micropayment channel networks. While [25] requires scripting functionalities that are not currently supported by Bitcoin, TumbleBit is fully compatible with Bitcoin. Moreover, while [25] does not provide an implementation, TumbleBit has been implemented (Section VIII). Finally, [25] requires both Alice A and Bob B to interact with the Tumbler T as part of every off-blockchain payment. Thus, there is a risk that the Tumbler could correlate the timing of its interactions with A and B in order to link their payment. Meanwhile, TumbleBit eliminates this timing side channel by only requiring interaction between A and T (and A and B) during an off-blockchain payment (see Figure 1 ).
Finally, TumbleBit is also related to concurrent work proposing Bolt [23] , an off-blockchain unlinkable payments channel. But while TumbleBit is fully implemented and compatible with Bitcoin, Bolt has not been implemented and employs complex scripting functionalities that are not available in Bitcoin. Moreover, Bolt's anonymity follows because it is backed by an anonymous cryptocurrency (e.g., zerocash [9] ).
Bitcoin Tumblers.
Prior work on classic Bitcoin Tumblers is summarized in Table I-A. Blindcoin [55] , and its predecessor Mixcoin [14] , use a trusted third party (TTP) to mix Bitcoin addresses. However, this third party can steal users' bitcoins; theft is detected but not prevented. In Mixcoin, the TTP can also violate anonymity. CoinSwap [35] is a fair-exchange mixer that allows two parties to anonymously send bitcoins through an intermediary. Fair exchange prevents the CoinSwap intermediary from stealing funds. Unlike TumbleBit, however, CoinSwap does not provide anonymity against even an honest-but-curious intermediary. Coinparty [56] is another decentralized solution, but it is secure only if 2/3 of the users are honest.
CoinShuffle [50] and CoinShuffle++ [41] build on CoinJoin [34] to provide a decentralized tumbler that prevents bitcoin theft. Their anonymity properties are analyzed in [38] . CoinShuffle and CoinJoin perform their mix in a single transaction, making them particularly vulnerable to DoS attacks where a user joins the mix and then aborts, disrupting the protocol for all other users. Decentralization also makes it easy for an attacker to create many Sybils and trick Alice A into mixing with them in order to deanonymize her payments [13] , [54] . Moreover, Bitcoin's maximum transaction size (100KB) limits these systems to 538 users per mix. Also, because these systems are decentralized, mix users interact via a peer-to-peer network in order to identify each other and mix payments. This need for coordination between users causes communication to grow quadratically [12] , [13] , limiting scalability; neither [50] nor [41] performs a mix with more than 50 users. TumbleBit sidesteps these scalability limitations by not requiring coordination between mix users.
XIM [12] builds on fair-exchange mixers like [7] . XIM prevents bitcoin theft, and uses fees to resist DoS and Sybil attacks-users must pay to participate in a mix, raising the bar for attackers that disrupt the protocol by joining the mix and then aborting. We use fees in TumbleBit as well. Also, an abort by a single XIM user does not disrupt the mix for others. TumbleBit also has this property. One of XIM's key innovations is a method for finding parties to participate in a mix. However, this adds several hours to the protocol, because users must advertise themselves as mix partners on the blockchain. TumbleBit is faster; a tumble requires only two blocks on the blockchain.
When used as a classic tumbler, TumbleBit and [25] shares the same fair-exchange properties and anonymity properties. However, unlike TumbleBit, [25] is not compatible with Bitcoin and does not provide an implementation. Also, [25] requires three blocks to be confirmed on the blockchain, while TumbleBit requires two.
II. BITCOIN SCRIPTS AND SMART CONTACTS
In designing TumbleBit, our key challenge was ensuring compatibility with today's Bitcoin protocol. We therefore start by reviewing Bitcoin transactions and Bitcoin's non-Turing-complete language Script.
Transactions. A Bitcoin user Alice A is identified by her bitcoin address (which is a public ECDSA key), and her bitcoins are "stored" in transactions. A single transaction can have multiple outputs and multiple inputs. Bitcoins are transferred by sending the bitcoins held in the output of one transaction to the input of a different transaction. The blockchain exists to provide a public record of all valid transfers. The bitcoins held in a transaction output can only be transferred to a single transaction input. A transaction input T 3 doublespends a transaction input T 2 when both T 2 and T 3 point to (i.e., attempt to transfer bitcoins from) the same transaction output T 1 . The security of the Bitcoin protocol implies that double-spending transactions will not be confirmed on the blockchain. Transactions also include a transaction fee that is paid to the Bitcoin miner that confirms the transaction on the blockchain. Higher fees are paid for larger transactions. Indeed, fees for confirming transactions on the blockchain are typically expressed as "Satoshi-per-byte" of the transaction.
Scripts.
Each transaction uses Script to determine the conditions under which the bitcoins held in that transaction can be moved to another transaction. We build "smart contracts" from the following transactions:
Transaction T offer : One party A offers to pay bitcoins to any party that can sign a transaction that meets some condition C. The T offer transaction is signed by A.
Transaction T fulfill : This transaction points to T offer , meets the condition C stipulated in T offer , and contains the public key of the party B receiving the bitcoins.
T offer is posted to the blockchain first. When T fulfill is confirmed by the blockchain, the bitcoins in T fulfill flow from the party signing transaction T offer to the party signing T fulfill . Bitcoin scripts support two types of conditions that involve cryptographic operations:
Hashing condition: The condition C stipulated in T offer is: "T fulfill must contain the preimage of value y computed under the hash function H." Then, T fulfill collects the offered bitcoin by including a value x such that H(x) = y. (We use the OP_RIPEMD160 opcode so that H is the RIPEMD-160 hash function.)
Signing condition: The condition C stipulated in T offer is: "T fulfill must be digitally signed by a signature that verifies under public key PK ." Then, T fulfill fulfills this condition if it is validly signed under PK . The signing condition is highly restrictive: (1) today's Bitcoin protocol requires the signature to be ECDSA over the Secp256k1 elliptic curve [48] -no other elliptic curves or types of signatures are supported, and (2) the condition specifically requires T fulfill itself to be signed. Thus, one could not use the signing condition to build a contract whose condition requires an arbitrary message m to be signed by PK .
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(TumbleBit uses the OP_CHECKSIG opcode, which requires verification of a single signature, and the "2-of-2 multisignature" template 'OP_2 key1 key2 OP_2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG' which requires verification of a signature under key1 AND a signature under key2 4 .) Script supports composing conditions under "IF" and "ELSE". Script also supports time-locking (OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY opcode [53] ), where T offer also stipulates that T fulfill has a timelock to a time window tw . This allows the party that posted T fulfill to reclaim their bitcoin if T fulfill is not spent and tw has passed. Section VIII-A details the scripts used in our implementation. See also Appendix I.
2-of-2 escrow.
TumbleBit relies heavily on the commonly-used 2-of-2 escrow smart contract. Suppose that Alice A wants to put Q bitcoin in escrow to be redeemed under the condition C 2of 2 : "the fulfilling transaction includes two signatures: one under public key PK 1 AND one under PK 2 ."
To do so, A first creates a multisig address PK (1, 2) for the keys PK 1 and PK 2 using the Bitcoin createmultisig command. Then, A posts an escrow transaction T escr on the blockchain that sends Q bitcoin to this new multisig address PK (1, 2) . The T escr transaction is essentially a T offer transaction that requires the fulfilling transaction to meet condition C 2of 2 . We call the fulfilling transaction T cash the cashout transaction. Given that A doesn't control both PK 1 and PK 2 (i.e., doesn't know the corresponding secret keys), we also timelock the T escr transaction for a time window tw . Thus, if a valid T cash is not confirmed by the blockchain within time window tw , the escrowed bitcoins can be reclaimed by A. Therefore, A's bitcoins are escrowed until either (1) the time window expires and A reclaims her bitcoins or (2) a valid T cash is confirmed. TumbleBit uses 2-of-2 escrow to establish pairwise payment channels, per Figure 1 .
III. TUMBLEBIT: AN UNLINKABLE PAYMENT HUB
Our goal is to allow a payer, Alice A, to unlinkably send 1 bitcoin to a payee, Bob B. Naturally, if Alice A signed a regular Bitcoin transaction indicating that Addr A pays 1 bitcoin to Addr B , then the blockchain would record a link between Alice A and Bob B and anonymity could be harmed using the techniques of [37] , [49] , [11] . Instead, TumbleBit funnels payments from multiple payer-payee pairs through the Tumbler T , using cryptographic techniques to ensure that no one, not even T , can link a payment to its corresponding payer A and payee B.
A. Overview of TumbleBit's Phases
We overview TumbleBit's phases under the assumption that Bob B receives a single payment of value 1 bitcoin. TumbleBit's Anonymity properties require all payments made in the system to have the same denomination; we use 1 bitcoin for simplicity.
Appendix A shows how Bob can receive multiple payments of denomination 1 bitcoin each. TumbleBit has three phases (Fig 1) . Off-blockchain TumbleBit payments take place during the middle so called Payment Phase, which can last for hours or even days. Meanwhile, the first Escrow Phase sets up payment channels, and the last Cash-Out Phase closes them down; these two phases require on-blockchain transactions. All users of TumbleBit know exactly when each phase begins and ends. One simple way to coordinate is to use block height; for instance, if the payment phase lasts for 1 day (i.e., ≈ 144 blocks) then the Escrow Phase could be when block height is divisible by 144, and the CashOut Phase could be when blockheight+1 is divisible by 144.
1: Escrow Phase. Every Alice A that wants to send payments (and Bob B that wants to receive payments) during the upcoming Payment Phase runs the escrow phase with T . The escrow phase has two parts:
(a) Payee B asks the Tumbler T to setup a payment channel. T escrows 1 bitcoin on the blockchain via a 2-of-2 escrow transaction (Section II) denoted as T escr(T ,B) stipulating that 1 bitcoin can be claimed by any transaction signed by both T and B. T escr(T ,B) is timelocked to time window tw 2 , after which T can reclaim its bitcoin. Similarly, the payeer A escrows 1 bitcoin in a 2-of-2 escrow with T denoted as T escr(A,T ) , timelocked for time window tw 1 such that tw 1 < tw 2 . Upon conclusion of the puzzle-promise protocol both the escrows are established by confirming T escr(A,T ) , T escr(T ,B) on Bitcoin's blockchain.
(b) Bob B obtains a puzzle z through an offblockchain cryptographic protocol with T which we call the puzzle-promise protocol. Conceptually, the output of this protocol is a promise by T to pay 1 bitcoin to B in exchange for the solution to a puzzle z. The puzzle z is just an RSA encryption of a value
where pk is the TumbleBit RSA public key of the Tumbler T . "Solving the puzzle" is equivalent to decrypting z and thus obtaining its "solution" . Meanwhile, the "promise" c is a symmetric encryption under key
where σ is the Tumbler's ECDSA-Secp256k1 signature on the transaction T cash(T ,B) which transfers the bitcoin escrowed in T escr(T ,B) from T to B. (We use ECDSASecp256k1 for compatibility with the Bitcoin protocol.) Thus, the solution to a puzzle z enables B to claim 1 bitcoin from T . To prevent misbehavior by the Tumbler T , our puzzle-promise protocol requires T to provide a proof that the puzzle solution is indeed the key which decrypt the promise ciphertext c. The details of this protocol, and its security guarantees, are in Section VI.
2: Payment Phase. Once Alice A indicates she is ready to pay Bob B, Bob B chooses a random blinding factor r ∈ Z * N and blinds the puzzle to z = r pk z mod N.
Blinding ensures that no one, not even T , can link the original puzzle z to its blinded version z. Bob B then sends z to A. Next, A solves the blinded puzzle z via by interacting with T . This puzzle-solver protocol is a fair exchange that ensures that A transfers 1 bitcoin to T iff T gives a valid solution to the puzzle z. Finally, Alice A sends the solution to the blinded puzzle back to Bob B. Bob unblinds to obtain the solution = /r mod N and accepts Alice's payment if the solution is valid, i.e., pk = z mod N .
3: Cash-Out Phase. Bob B uses the puzzle solution to decrypt the ciphertext c. From the result B can create a transaction T cash(T ,B) that is signed by both T and B. Bob B posts T cash(T ,B) to the blockchain to receive 1 bitcoin from T .
Our protocol crucially relies on the algebraic properties of RSA, and RSA blinding. To make sure that the Tumbler is using a valid RSA public key pk , TumbleBit also has an one-time setup phase: 0: Setup. Tumbler T announces its RSA public key pk and Bitcoin address Addr T , together with a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge π 5 of the corresponding RSA secret key sk . Every user of TumbleBit validates pk using π.
B. Overview of Alice's Interaction with the Tumbler
We now focus on the puzzle-solving protocol between A and the Tumbler T to show how TumbleBit allows A to make many off-blockchain payments via only two on-blockchain transactions (aiding scalability).
During the Escrow Phase, Alice opens a payment channel with the Tumbler T by escrowing Q bitcoins in transaction T escr(A,T ) on the blockchain. Each escrowed bitcoin can be used to pay T for the solution to one puzzle. Next, during the off-blockchain Payment Phase, A makes off-blockchain payments to j ≤ Q payees. Finally, during the Cash-Out Phase, Alice A pays the Tumbler T by posting a transaction T cash(A,T ) (j) that reflects the new allocation of bitcoins; namely, that T holds j bitcoins, while A holds Q − i bitcoins. The details of Alice A's interaction with T , which are based on a technique used in micropayment channels [44, p. 86] , are as follows:
1: Escrow Phase. Alice A posts a 2-of-2 escrow transaction T escr(A,T ) to the blockchain that escrows Q of Alice's bitcoins. If no valid transaction T cash(A,T ) is posted before time window tw 1 , then all Q escrowed bitcoins can be reclaimed by A.
2: Payment Phase. Alice A uses her escrowed bitcoins to perform off-blockchain payments to the Tumble T . For each payment, A and T engage in an off-blockchain puzzle-solver protocol as described in Sections V-B,V-D. Once the puzzle is solved, Alice signs and gives to T a new transaction T cash(A,T ) (i). T cash(A,T ) (i) points to T escr(A,T ) and reflects the new balance between A and T (namely that T holds i bitcoins while A holds Q − i bitcoins). T collects a new T cash(A,T ) (i) from A for each payment. If Alice refuses to sign T cash(A,T ) (i), then the Tumbler refuses to help Alice solve further puzzles. Importantly, each T cash(A,T ) (i) for i = 1...j (for j < Q) is signed only by Alice A but not by T , and is not posted to the blockchain. Moreover, each T cash(A,T ) (i) points to the same 2-of-2 escrow transaction T escr(A,T ) . At the end of the Payment Phase, A has made j payments, and the Tumbler T has transaction T cash(A,T ) (j), signed by Alice A, reflecting a balance of j bitcoins for T and Q − j bitcoins for T .
3: Cash-Out Phase. The Tumbler T claims its bitcoins from T escr(A,T ) by signing T cash(A,T ) (j) and posting it to the blockchain. This fulfills the condition in T cash(A,T ) , which stipulated that the escrowed coins be claimed by a transaction signed by both A and T . (Notice that all the T cash(A,T ) (i) point to the same escrow transaction T escr(A,T ) . The blockchain will therefore only confirm one of these transactions; otherwise, double spending would occur. Rationally, the Tumbler T always prefers to confirm T cash(A,T ) (j) since it transfers the maximum number of bitcoins to T .) Because T cash(A,T ) (j) is the only transaction signed by the Tumbler T , a cheating Alice cannot steal bitcoins by posting a transaction that allocates fewer than j bitcoins to the Tumbler T .
Remark: Scaling Bitcoin. A similar (but more elaborate) technique can be applied between B and T so that only two on-blockchain transactions suffice for Bob B to receive an arbitrary number of off-blockchain payments. Details are in Appendix A. Given that each party uses two on-blockchain transactions to send/receive multiple offline payments, Tumblebit helps Bitcoin scale.
C. TumbleBit's Security Properties
Our threat model assumes that payers (Alice A), payees (Bob B) and Tumbler T are all mutually distrustful. The payment system should satisfy the following security properties:
Unlinkability. Assume the Tumbler T does not collude with other users. The view of the T consists of (1) −→ B i ), (2) the set of puzzle-solver protocols completed with each payer A j during the Payment Phase, and (3) the set of cashout transactions made by each payer A j and each payee B i during the Cash-Out Phase. An interaction graph is a mapping of payments from payers A = A 1 , . . . , A κ to payees. An interaction graph is compatible if it explains the view of the Tumbler T . Then, unlinkability requires that compatible interaction graph which is equally likely; anonymity therefore depends on the number of compatible interaction graphs. A high-level proof of how TumbleBit achieves unlinkability is in Section VII.
Balance. The system should not be exploited to print new money or steal money, even when parties collude. As in [23] , we call this property balance, which at highlevel establishes that no party should be able to cashout more bitcoins than what is dictated by the payments that were successfully completed in the off-blockchain Payment Phase. We discuss how our system satisfies balance in Section VII. DoS and Sybil protection. TumbleBit uses transaction fees to resist DoS and Sybil attacks. Every Bitcoin transaction can include a transaction fee that is paid to the Bitcoin miner who confirms the transaction on the blockchain as an incentive to confirm transactions. However, because the Tumbler T does not trust Alice A and Bob B, T should not be expected to pay fees on the transactions posted during the Escrow Phase. To this end, when Alice A establishes a payment channel with T , she pays for both the Q escrowed in transaction T escr(A,T ) and for its transaction fees. Meanwhile, when the Tumbler T and Bob B establish a payment channel, the Q escrowed bitcoins in T escr(T ,B) are paid in the Tumbler T , but the transaction fees are paid by Bob B (Section III-A). Per [12] , fees raise the cost of an DoS attack where B starts and aborts many parallel sessions, locking T 's bitcoins in escrow transactions. This similarly provides Sybil resistance, making it expensive for an adversary to harm anonymity by tricking a user into entering a run of TumbleBit where all other users are Sybils under the adversary's control.
IV. TUMBLEBIT: ALSO A CLASSIC TUMBLER.
We can also operate TumbleBit as classic Bitcoin Tumbler. As a classic Tumbler, TumbleBit operates in epoches, each of which (roughly) requires two blocks to be confirmed on the blockchain (≈ 20 mins). During each epoch, there are exactly ℵ distinct bitcoin addresses making payments (payers) and ℵ bitcoin addresses receiving payments (payees). Each payment is of denomination 1 bitcoin, and the mapping from payers to payees is a bijection. During one epoch, the protocol itself is identical to that in Section III with the following changes: (1) the duration of the Payment Phase shrinks to seconds (rather than hours or days); (2) each payment channel escrows exactly Q = 1 bitcoin; and (3) every payee Bob B receives payments at an ephemeral bitcoin address Addr B chosen freshly for the epoch.
A. Anonymity Properties
As a classic tumbler, TumbleBit has the same balance property, but stronger anonymity: k-anonymity within an epoch [25] , [12] . Specifically, while the blockchain reveals which payers and payees participated in an epoch, no one (not even the Tumbler T ) can tell which payer paid which payee during that specific epoch. Thus, if k payments successfully completed during an epoch, the anonymity set is of size k. (This stronger property follows directly from our unlinkability definition (Section III-C): there are k compatible interaction graphs because the interaction graph is bijection.)
Recovery from anonymity failures. It's not always the case that k = ℵ. The exact anonymity level achieved in an epoch can be established only after its Cash-Out Phase. For instance, anonymity is reduced to k = ℵ − 1 if T aborts an payment made by payer A j . We deal with this by requiring B to uses an ephemeral Bitcoin address Addr B in each epoch. Consider first a malicious Tumbler T that behaves itself during the Escrow Phase of some epoch, but then refuses to help some payer A solve a puzzle during the Payment Phase. The payment from A to its payee B will fail. As such, the payee B will not be able to claim a bitcoin from T during the Cash-Out Phase. It follows that the Tumbler can trivially link A and B by identifying the payee that failed to cash out. To recover from this, we follow [25] and require B to discard his ephemeral address and never use it again if T aborts the protocol. Note that both B loses nothing in this case, since no funds have been transferred from T to B. Also, A loses nothing, since by the fair-exchange property of the puzzle-solver protocol (Theorem 1) T only obtains a bitcoin from A if it cooperated in solving the puzzle.
Let us now consider a non-aborting epoch with a small anonymity set. If B is comfortable with the size of his anonymity set, he can use standard Bitcoin transactions to move the bitcoin from his ephemeral address to his long-lived Bitcoin address. Otherwise, if he thinks that the anonymity set is too small, B can remix, i.e., choose a new fresh ephemeral address Addr B and rerun the protocol where his old ephemeral address Addr B pays his new ephemeral address Addr B . Remixing can continue until B is happy with the size of his anonymity set, and he transfers his funds to his long-lived address.
Remark: Intersection attacks. While this notion of kanonymity is commonly used in Bitcoin tumblers (e.g., [12] , [25] ), it does suffer from the following weakness. Any adversary that observes the transactions posted to the blockchain within one epoch can learn which payers and payees participated in that epoch. Then, this information can be correlated to de-anonymize users across epochs (e.g., using frequency analysis or techniques used to break k-anonymity [20] ). These 'intersection attacks' follow because k-anonymity is composed across epochs; see also [12] , [38] for discussion.
DoS and Sybil Attacks. We once again use fees to resist DoS and Sybil attacks. Alice again pays for both the Q escrowed in transaction T escr(A,T ) and for its transaction fees. However, we run into a problem if we want Bob B to pay the fee on the escrow transaction T escr(T ,B) . Because Bob B uses a freshly-chosen Bitcoin address Addr B , that is not linked to any prior transaction on the blockchain, Addr B cannot hold any bitcoins. Thus, Bob B will have to pay the Tumbler T out of band. The anonymous fee vouchers described in [25] provide one way to address this, which also has the additional feature that payers A cover all fees. An anonymous fee voucher is a blind signature σ that T provides to A in exchange for a small out-of-band payment; A could pre-purchase these vouchers in bulk, before she begins participating in TumbleBit. Then, when A is ready to participate, she unblinds σ to σ and provides it to B who passes it along to T . The protocol begins once T is sure that it was paid for its efforts.
V. A FAIR EXCHANGE FOR RSA PUZZLE SOLVING
We now explain how to realize a Bitcoin-compatible fair-exchange where Alice A pays Tumbler T one bitcoin iff the T provides a valid solution to an RSA puzzle. The Tumbler T has an RSA secret key sk and the corresponding public key pk and RSA modulus N are public. The RSA puzzle y is provided by Alice, and its solution is an RSA secret-key exponentiation
The puzzle solution is essentially an RSA decryption or RSA signing operation.
This protocol is at the heart of TumbleBit's Payment Phase. However, we also think that this protocol is of independent interest, since there is also a growing interest in techniques that can fairly exchange a bitcoin for the solution to a computational "puzzle". We therefore start by surveying the literature in Section V-A. In Section V-B we present our RSA-puzzle-solver protocol as a stand-alone protocol that requires two blocks to be confirmed on the blockchain. Our protocol is fastsolving 2048-bit RSA puzzles faster than [36] 's protocol for solving 16x16 Sudoku puzzles (Section VIII)). Also, the use of RSA means that our protocol supports solving blinded puzzles (see equation (2) , and thus can be used to create an unlinkable payment scheme. Section V-D shows how our protocol is integrated into TumbleBit's off-blockchain Payment Phase. Implementation results are in Table II of Section VIII-B.
A. Approaches from the Literature Contingent payments.
Maxwell described a protocol for "zero-knowledge contingent payments" (ZKCP) [33] . The scheme in [33] swaps one bitcoin from Alice A in exchange for having T compute any agreed-upon function f on an input of A's choosing. The idea is as follows. After T computes the result f (y) on Alice's input y, it encrypts the result under a randomly chosen key k to obtain a ciphertext c, and hashes the encryption key to obtain h = H(k). T then sends Alice A the ciphertext c and hash h along with a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof that they were formed correctly. (This proof must been done in zero knowledge, because T should not reveal k of f (y) to A before being paid with A's bitcoin.) After A verifies the proof, A posts a transaction T puzzle offering one bitcoin under condition: "T solve must contain the hash preimage of h". T claims the bitcoin by posting a transaction T solve containing k. Now A can use k to decrypt c to obtain her desired output f (y). This realizes a fair exchange because the offered bitcoin reverts back to A if T fails to post a valid T solve in a timely manner.
The limitations of using ZKCP in this setting arise due to the inefficiency of the instantiations of ZK proofs. Two main approaches exist:
ZKCP via ZK-Snarks. Recently, [36] showed how to instantiate the ZK proofs used in this protocol with ZKSnarks [10] . The function f was a 16x16 Sudoku puzzle and the resulting protocol was run and completed within 20 seconds. We could use this approach in our setting by (1) letting f be f
RSA , an RSA decryption/signature, and (2) using [36] 's ZK-snark but replacing the verification of the Sudoku puzzle with an RSA verification f RSA . One disadvantage of this approach is that RSA verification within a ZK-Snark is likely to be slower than Sudoku puzzle verification because state-of-the-art ZKSnarks operate in prime order fields of (roughly) 254 bits. Since a 2048-bit RSA verification deals with 2048-bit numbers, each such number has to be split up and expressed as an array of smaller ones, making arithmetic operations far more complicated [18] . In any case, our protocol for RSA exponentiation is faster than [36] 's protocol for 16x16 Sudoku puzzles (Section VIII). Also, ZK-Snarks are only secure under less standard cryptographic assumptions. Meanwhile, our protocol's security follows from the standard RSA assumption (in the random oracle model).
ZKCP via Garbled Circuits. As an alternative to ZKSnarks, one could use more generic ZK proofs based on zero-knowledge garbled circuits (GC) as shown in [27] . While GC-based ZK proofs work reasonably well for evaluating hash functions, they are computationally heavier for modular exponentiations (like RSA verification) because the latter do not have a short Boolean-circuit representation [28] .
Incentivizing correct computation. [29] proposed a different approach that also uses GCs. Two parties use GCs to compute an arbitrary function g(a, b) without revealing their respective inputs a and b. [29] 's protocol has the added feature that if one party aborts before the output is revealed, the other party is automatically compensated with bitcoins. To use this protocol in our setting, the function g should be f
RSA , input a is the RSA secret key sk of T , and b becomes the input y chosen by A. Then, if T aborts the protocol before A learns the output, the bitcoin offered by A can be reclaimed by A. Again, however, the efficiency of this approach is limited by the computational overhead of performing modular exponentiations inside a GC.
Our protocol sidesteps these issues by avoiding ZK proofs and GCs altogether.
B. Our (Stand-Alone) RSA-Puzzle-Solver Protocol
The following stand-alone protocol description assumes Alice A wants to transfer 1 bitcoin in exchange for one puzzle solution. We show how the protocol is modified to support the transfer of up to Q bitcoins for Q puzzle solutions (where each solution is worth one bitcoin) in Section V-D.
The core idea is similar to that of contingent payments: Tumbler T solves Alice's A's puzzle y by computing the solution y sk mod N , then encrypts the solution under a randomly chosen key k to obtain a ciphertext c, hashes the key k under bitcoin's hash as h = H(k) and finally, provides (c, h) to Alice. Alice A prepares T puzzle offering one bitcoin in exchange for the preimage of h. Tumbler T earns the bitcoin by posting a transaction T solve that contains k, the preimage of h, and thus fulfills the condition in T puzzle and claims a bitcoin for T . Alice A learns k from T solve , and uses k to decrypt c and obtain the solution to her puzzle.
Our challenge is to find a mechanism that allows A to validate that c is the encryption of the correct value, without using ZK proofs. We do so by applying the cut-and-choose technique and exploiting the blinding properties of RSA. (We follow the blueprint of Lindell's recent work [32] . Roughly, a malicious party can only cheat if all of the "opened" values are correct and all of the "hidden" ones are incorrect. This allows us to use fewer values in order to more efficiently achieve a better security level.)
Thus, instead of asking T to provide just one (c, h) pair, T will be asked to provide n + m pairs (Step 3).
Public input: (pk , N ). π proves validity of pk in a one-time-only setup phase. Alice A Tumbler T Input: Puzzle y Secret input: sk
Post transaction T puzzle
T puzzle offers 1 bitcoin within timewindow tw 1 under condition "the fulfilling transaction is signed by T and has preimages of h j ∀j ∈ R". 9. Check β j unblind to y ∀j ∈ R y, rj ∀j∈R Fig. 2 . RSA puzzle solving protocol. H and H prg are modeled as random oracles. In our implementation, H is RIPEMD-160, and H prg is ChaCha20 with a 128-bit key, so that λ 1 = 128.
Then, we use cut and choose: A asks T to "open" n of these pairs, by revealing the randomly-chosen keys k i 's used to create each of the n pairs (Step 7). For a malicious T to successfully cheat A, it would have to correctly identify all the n "challenge" pairs and form them properly (so it does not get caught cheating), while at the same time malforming all the m unopened pairs (so it can claim a bitcoin from A without actually providing a puzzle solution in return). Since T cannot predict which pairs A asks it to open, T can only cheat with very low probability 1/ m+n n .
However, we have a problem. Why should T agree to open any of the (c, h) values that it produced? If A received the opening of a correctly formed (c, h) pair, she would be able to obtain a puzzle solution without paying a bitcoin. As such, we introduce the notion of "fake values". Specifically, the n (c, h)-pairs that A asks T to open will open to "fake values" rather than "real" puzzles. Before T agrees to open them (Step 7), A must prove that these n values are indeed fake (Step 6).
We also need to ensure that T cannot distinguish "real puzzles" from "fake values". We solve this problem using RSA blinding. The real puzzle y is blinded m times with different RSA-blinding factors (Step 1), while the n fake values are RSA-blinded as well (Step 2). Finally, real and fake values are randomly permuted (Step 3) before they are sent over to T . Once Alice confirms the correctness of the opened "fake" (c, h) values (Step 7), she signs a transaction T puzzle offering one bitcoin for the keys k that open all of the m "real" (c, h) values (Step 8). Now, we have another problem. What if Alice cheated, so that each of the "real" (c, h) values opened to a the solution to a different puzzle? This would not be fair to T , since A should pay for each solved puzzle. We solve this problem in Step 9: once A posts T puzzle , she proves to T that all m "real" values open to the same puzzle y. This is done by revealing the RSA-blinding factors used to blind the puzzle y. Once T verifies this, T agrees to post T solve which reveals m of the k values that open "real" (c, h) pairs (Step 10). A is guaranteed a valid solution to puzzle y as long as at least one of the real (c, h) pairs is validly formed (Step 11).
C. Fair Exchange
Fair exchange exchange entails the following: (1) Fairness for T : After one execution of the protocol A will learn the correct solution y sk mod N to at most one puzzle y of her choice. (2) Fairness for A: T will earn 1 bitcoin iff A obtains a correct solution.
To prove that our protocol satisfies these requirements, we use the real-ideal paradigm [21] . We call the ideal functionality F fair-RSA and present it in Appendix C. F fair-RSA acts like a trusted party between A and T . F fair-RSA receives a puzzle-solving request of the form (y, 1 bitcoin) from A, and forwards the request to T . If T agrees to solve the puzzle y for A, then T receives 1 bitcoin while A receives the puzzle solution. Otherwise, if T refuses, A will get 1 bitcoin back, and T gets nothing. Fairness for T is captured because A can request a puzzle solution only if she sends 1 bitcoin to F fair-RSA . Fairness for B is captured because T receives 1 bitcoin only if he agrees to reveal the puzzle solution. The proof of the following is in Appendix E:
Theorem 1: Let λ be the security parameter, m, n be statistical security parameters, let N > 2 λ . Let π be a publicly verifiable zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in the random oracle model. If the RSA assumption holds in Z * N , and if functions H prg , H are independent random oracles, there exists a negligible function ν, such that protocol in Figure 2 securely realizes F fair-RSA in the random oracle model with the following security guarantees. The security for T is 1−ν(λ) while security for
D. Solving Many Puzzles
To integrate the protocol in Figure 2 into TumbleBit, we have to deal with three problems. First, if TumbleBit is to scale Bitcoin as discussed in Section III-B, Alice A needs to be able to use only two on-blockchain transactions T escr(A,T ) and T cash(A,T ) to pay for the solution of an arbitrary number of Q puzzles during the Payment Phase (where each solution is worth 1 bitcoin); the protocol in Figure 2 only allows for the solution to a single puzzle. Second, recall from Section III-B that the puzzle-solving protocol should occur entirely off-blockchain; the protocol in Figure 2 uses two onblockchain transactions T puzzle and T solve . Third, the T solve transactions are quite longer than a typical fulfilling transaction (since they contain m hash preimages) which means that they require higher transaction fees. We describe how we deal with these issues.
Escrow Phase. Before puzzle solving begins, Alice posts a 2-of-2 escrow transaction T escr(A,T ) to the blockchain that escrows Q bitcoins, (per Section III-B). T escr(A,T ) is timelocked to time window tw 1 , and stipulates that the escrowed bitcoins can be transferred to a transaction signed by both A and T .
Payment Phase.
Alice can solve up to Q puzzles, paying one bitcoin for each solution. Tumbler T keeps a counter of how many puzzles it has solved for Alice, making sure that the counter does not exceed Q. When Alice wants to have her i th puzzle solved, she runs the protocol in Figure 2 with the following modifications after Step 8 (so that it runs entirely off-blockchain):
(1) Transaction T puzzle from Figure 2 now points to the escrow transaction; T puzzle changes the balance so that T holds i bitcoin and Alice A holds Q − i bitcoins. T puzzle still stipulates the same condition as shown in Figure 2 : "the fulfilling transaction is signed by T and has preimages of h j ∀j ∈ R." (2) Because the Payment Phase is off-blockchain, transaction T puzzle is not posted to the blockchain. Instead, Alice A forms and signs transaction T puzzle and sends it to the Tumbler T . Importantly, Tumbler T does not sign or post this transaction yet. (Note that if T puzzle was signed by T and confirmed on the blockchain, then the bitcoins in T escr(A,T ) would be transferred to T puzzle . However these bitcoins would remain locked in T puzzle until the blockchain confirmed a transaction fulfilling the condition stipulated in T puzzle .) (3) Instead of revealing the preimages k j ∀j ∈ R in an on-blockchain transaction T solve as in Figure 2 , the Tumbler T just sends the preimages directly to Alice. In this case, the Tumbler immediately begins to cash out, even without waiting for the Cash-Out Phase. Specifically, Tumbler T holds transaction T puzzle (i), signed by A, which reflects a correct balance of i bitcoins to T and Q − i bitcoins to A. Thus, T signs T puzzle (i) and posts it to the blockchain. Then, T claims the bitcoins locked in T puzzle (i) by signing and posting transaction T solve . As in Figure 2 , T solve fulfills T puzzle by containing the m preimages k j ∀j ∈ R. The bitcoin in T escr(A,T ) will be transferred to T puzzle and then to T solve and thus to the Tumbler T . The only harm done is that T posts two longer transactions T puzzle , T solve (instead of just T cash(A,T ) ), which require higher fees to be confirmed on the blockchain. (Indeed, this is why we have introduced the T cash(A,T ) (i) transaction.)
Cash-Out Phase. Alice has j puzzle solutions once the the Payment Phase is over and the Cash-Out Phase begins. If the Tumbler T has a transaction T cash(A,T ) (j) signed by Alice, the Tumbler T just signs and post this transaction to the blockchain, claiming its j bitcoins.
While we have described this protocol in the context of TumbleBit, it also stands alone as a fair-exchange protocol that uses only two on-blockchain transactions solve an arbitrary number of RSA puzzles. We implement this protocol and evaluate its performance in Table II and Section VIII-B.
VI. PUZZLE-PROMISE PROTOCOL
We present the puzzle-promise protocol run between B and T in the Escrow Phase. Recall from Section III-A, that the goal of this protocol is to provide Bob B with a puzzle-promise pair (c, z). The "promise" c is an encryption (under key ) of the Tumbler's ECDSA-Secp256k1 signature σ on the transaction T cash(T ,B) which transfers the bitcoin escrowed in T cash(T ,B) from T to B. Meanwhile the RSA-puzzle z hides the encryption key per equation (1) .
If Tumbler T just sent a pair (c, z) to Bob, then Bob has no guarantee that the promise c is actually encrypting the correct signature, or that z is actually hiding the correct encryption key. On the other hand, T cannot just reveal the signature σ directly, because Bob could use σ to claim the bitcoin escrowed in T escr(T ,B) without actually being paid (off-blockchain) by Alice A during TumbleBit's Payment Phase.
To solve this problem, we again use a Lindellstyle [32] cut-and-choose technique: we ask T to compute many puzzle-promise pairs (c i , z i ), and have B test that some of the pairs are computed correctly. As in Section V-B, we use "fake" transactions (that will be "opened" and used only to check if the other party has cheated) and "real" transactions (that remain "unopened" and result in correctly-formed puzzle-promise pairs). Cut-and-choose guarantees that Bob B knows that at least one of the unopened pairs is correct formed. However, how does Bob B know which puzzle z i is correctly formed? Importantly, Bob can only choose one puzzle z i that he will ask Alice A to solve during TumbleBit's Payment Phase (Section III-A). To deal with this, we introduce an RSA quotient-chain technique that ties together all puzzles z i so that solving one puzzle z j1 gives the solution to all other puzzles.
In this section, we assume that B wishes to obtain only a single payment of denomination 1 bitcoin; the protocol as described in Figure 3 and Section VI-A suffices to run TumbleBit as a classic tumbler. We discuss its security properties in Section VI-B and implementation in Section VIII-B. In Appendix A and Figure 5 , we show how to modify this protocol so that it allows B to receive arbitrary number of Q off-blockchain payments using only two on-blockchain transactions.
A. Protocol Walk Through
B prepares µ distinct "real" transactions and η "fake" transactions, hides them by hashing them with H (Step 2-3), permutes them (Step 4), and finally sends them to T as β 1 , ..., β m+n . In Step 5, T signs each β i to create an ECDSA-Secp256k1 signature σ i . Each σ i is then hidden inside an promise c i which can decrypted with key i . Finally, T hides each i (the encryption keys) in an RSA puzzle z i per equation (1) . As each i is uniformly chosen at random, puzzle z i computationally hides its solution i , under the RSA assumption Next, B needs to check that the η "fake" (c i , z i ) pairs are correctly formed by T (Step 8). To do this, B needs T to provide the solutions i to the puzzles z i in fake pairs. T reveals these solutions only after B has proved that the η pairs really are fake (Step 7). Once this check is done, B knows that T can cheat with probability less than 1/ µ+η η . Now we need our new trick. We want to ensure that if at least one of the "real" (c i 
B. Security Properties
We again capture the security requirements of the puzzle-promise protocol using real-ideal paradigm [21] . The ideal functionality F promise-sign is presented in Appendix D. F promise-sign is designed to guarantee the following properties: (1) Fairness for T : Bob B learns nothing except signatures on fake transactions. (2) Fairness for B: If T agrees to complete the protocol, then Bob B obtains at least one puzzle-promise pair. To do this, F promise-sign acts a trusted party between B and T . Bob B sends the "real" and "fake" transactions to 
VII. TUMBLEBIT SECURITY
We discuss TumbleBit's unlinkability and balance properties. See Section III-C for DoS/Sybil resistance.
A. Unlinkability
Unlinkability is defined in Section III-C. The property must hold against a malicious T * that does not collude with other users. We show that all interaction graphs G compatible with T * 's view are equally likely. The view of T * consists of (1) Next, observe that transcripts of the puzzlepromise and puzzle-solver protocols are informationtheoretically unlinkable. This follows because the puzzle z used by any A j in the puzzle-solver protocol is equally likely to be the blinding of any of the puzzles z that appear in the puzzle-promise protocols played with any B i (see Section III-A, equation (2)).
Finally, we assume secure channels, so that T * cannot eavesdrop on communication between A j 's and B i 's, and that T * cannot use network information to correlate A j 's and B i 's (by e.g., observing that they share the same IP address). Then, the above two observations imply that all interaction graphs, compatible with the view of T * , are equally likely. under key PK B ."
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B. Balance
The definition of balance was discussed, at highlevel, in Section III-C. We analyze balance in two cases.
Tumbler T * is corrupt. We want to show that all the bitcoins paid to T by all A j 's can be later claimed by the B i 's. (That is, a malicious T * cannot refuse a payment to Bob after being paid by Alice.) This follows from (1) the fairness of the puzzle-promise and puzzlesolver protocols, and (2) the timelocks on transactions T escr(A,T ) (timelock tw 1 ) and T escr(T ,B) (timelock tw cannot claim any bitcoin at the end of the Escrow Phase. Next, the fairness of the puzzle-solver protocol guarantees that if T completes SP j successful puzzle-solver protocol executions with A * j , then A * j gets the solution to exactly SP j puzzles. Payees B * i use the solved puzzles to claim bitcoins from T . By the unforgeability of ECDSA signatures (and assuming that the blockchain prevents double-spending), all colluding B * i cash-out no more than min( j SP j , t) bitcoin in total, where t is the total number of bitcoins escrowed by T across all B * i .
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION
To show that TumbleBit is performant and compatible with Bitcoin, we implemented TumbleBit as a classic tumbler. (That is, each payer and payee can send/receive Q = 1 payment/epoch.) We then used TumbleBit to mix bitcoins from 800 payers (Alice A) to 800 payees (Bob B). We describe how our implementation instantiates our TumbleBit protocols. We then measure the off-blockchain performance, i.e., compute time, running time, and bandwidth consumed. Finally, we describe two full-fledged on-blockchain tests of TumbleBit. 
A. Protocol Instantiation
We instantiated our protocols with 2048-bit RSA. The hash functions and signatures are instantiated as described in the captions to Figure 2 and Figure 3 . 7 Choosing m and n in the puzzle-solving protocol. Per Theorem 1, the probability that T can cheat is parameterized by 1/ m+n m where m is the number of "real" values and n is the number of "fake" values in Figure 2 . From a security perspective, we want m and n to be as large as possible, but in practice we are constrained by the Bitcoin protocol. Our main constraint is that m RIPEMD-160 hash outputs must be stored in T puzzle of our puzzle-solver protocol. Bitcoin P2SH scripts (as described below) are limited in size to 520 bytes, which means m ≤ 21. Increasing m also increases the transaction fees. Fortunately, n is not constrained by the Bitcoin protocol; increasing n only means we perform more off-blockchain RSA exponentiations. Therefore, we chose m = 15 and n = 285 to bound T 's cheating probability to 2 equals RIPEMD-160's collision probability.)
Choosing µ and η in the puzzle-promise protocol. Theorem 2 also allows T to cheat with probability 1/ µ+η µ . However, this protocol has no Bitcoin-related constraints on µ and η. Thus, we take µ = η = 42 to achieve a security level of 2
−80
while minimizing the number of off-blockchain RSA computations performed in Figure 3 (which is µ + η).
Scripts. By default, Bitcoin clients and miners only operate on transactions that fall into one of the five standard Bitcoin transaction templates. We therefore conform to the Pay-To-Script-Hash (P2SH) [4] template. To format transaction T offer (per Section II) as a P2SH, we specify a redeem script (written in Script) whose condition C must be met to fulfill the transaction. This redeem script is hashed and stored in transaction T offer . To transfer funds out of T offer , a transaction T fulfill is constructed. T fulfill includes (1) the redeem script and (2) a set of input values that the redeem script is run against. To programmatically validate that T fulfill can fulfill T offer , the redeem script T fulfill is hashed, and 7 There were slight difference between our protocols as described in this paper and the implementation used in some of the tests. In Figure 2 , A reveals blinds r j ∀j ∈ R to T , our implementation instead reveals an encrypted version r pk j ∀j ∈ R. This change does not affect performance, since A hold both r j and r pk j . Also, our implementation omits the index hashes h R and h F from Figure 3 ; these are two 256-bit hash outputs and thus should not significantly affect performance either. We have since removed this differences from our implementation. the resulting hash value is compared to the hash value stored in T offer . If these match, the redeem script is run against the input values in T fulfill . T fulfill fulfills T offer if the redeem script outputs true. All our redeem scripts include a time-locked refund condition, that allows the party offering T offer to reclaim the funds after a time window expires. To do so, the party signs and posts a refund transaction T refund that points to T offer and reclaims the funds locked in T offer . We reproduce our scripts in Appendix I.
B. Off-Blockchain Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance for a run of our protocols between one payer Alice A, one payee Bob B and the Tumbler T . We used several machines for our tests: an EC2 t2.medium instance in Tokyo (2 Cores at 2.50 GHz and 4 GB of RAM), a MacBook Pro in Boston (2.8 GHz processor and 16 GB RAM), and Digital Ocean nodes in New York, Toronto and Frankfurt (1 Core at 2.40 GHz and 512 MB RAM).
Puzzle-solver protocol (Table II) . The total network bandwidth consumed by our protocol was 269 Kb, which is roughly 1/8th the size of the "average webpage" per [52] (2212 Kb). Next, we test the total (offblockchain) computation time for our puzzle-solver protocol (Section V-B) by running both parties (A and T ) on the Boston machine. We test the impact of network latency by running A in Boston and T in Tokyo, and then with T in New York. (The average Boston-toTokyo Round Trip Times (RTT) was 187 ms and the Boston-to-New York RTT was 9 ms.) From Table II , we see the protocol completes in < 4 seconds, with running time dominated by network latency. Indeed, even when A and T are very far apart, our 2048-bit RSA puzzle solving protocol is still faster than [36] 's 16x16 Sudoku puzzle solving protocol, which takes 20 seconds. (Table II) .
TumbleBit as a classic tumbler
Next, we consider classic Tumbler mode (Section IV). We consider a scenario where A and B use the same machine, because Alice A wants anonymize her bitcoin by transferring it to a fresh ephemeral bitcoin address that she controls. Thus, we run (1) A and B in Boston and T in Tokyo, and (2) A and B in Boston and T in New York. To prevent the Tumbler T for linking A and B via their IP address, we also tested with (a) B connecting to T over Tor, and (b) both A and B connected through Tor. Per Table II , running time is bound by network latency, but is < 11 seconds even with when both parties connect to Tokyo over Tor. Connecting to New York (in clear) results in ≈ 1 second running time. Compute time is only 0.6 seconds, again measured by running A, B and T on the Boston machine. Thus, TumbleBit's performance, as a classic Tumbler, is bound by the time it takes to confirm 2 blocks on the blockchain (≈ 20 minutes).
Performance of TumbleBit's Phases. (Table II ) Next, we break out the performance of each of TumbleBit's phases when Q = 1. We start by measuring compute time by running all A, B and T on the Boston machine. Then, we locate each party on different machines. We first set A in Toronto, B in Boston and T in New York and get RTTs to be 22 ms from Boston to New York, 23 ms from New York to Toronto, and 55 ms from Toronto to Boston. Then we set A in Frankfurt, B in Boston and T in Tokyo and get RTTs to be 106 ms from Boston to Frankfurt, 240 ms from Frankfurt to Tokyo, and 197 ms from Tokyo to Boston. An off-blockchain payment in the Payment Phase completes in under 5 seconds and most of the running time is due to network latency. Test where everyone behaves. In our first test, all parties completed the protocol without aborting. We tumbled 800 payments between ℵ = 800 payers and ℵ = 800 payees, resulting in 3200 transactions posted to the blockchain and a k-anonymity of k = 800.The puzzle-promise escrow transactions T escr(T ,B) are all funded from this TXID and the puzzler-solver escrow transactions T escr(A,T ) are all funded from this TXID. This test completed in 23 blocks in total, with Escrow Phase completing in 16 blocks, Payment Phase taking 1 block, and Cash-Out Phase completing in 6 blocks.
C. Blockchain Tests
We note, however, that our protocol could also have completed much faster, e.g., with 1 block for the Escrow Phase, and 1 block for the Cash Out Phase. A Bitcoin block can typically hold ≈ 5260 of our 2-of-2 escrow transactions T escr and ≈ 2440 of our cash-out transaction T cash . We could increase transaction fees to make sure that our Escrow Phase and Cash-Out phase (each confirming 2 × 800 transactions) occur within one block. In our tests, we used fairly conservative transaction fees (Table IV) . While the exact fees needed vary from minute to minute, doubling our fees to 60 Satoshi per Byte should be sufficient under standard transaction volume. 9 As a classic Tumbler, we therefore expect TumbleBit to have a higher denomination than the 0.0000769 BTC we used for our test. For instance, transaction fees of 60 Satoshi per Byte (0.0007644 BTC/user) are ≈ 1/1000 of a denomination of 0.5 BTC.
Test with uncooperative behavior. Our second run of only 10 users (5 payers and 5 payees) demonstrates how fair exchange is enforced in the face of uncooperative or malicious parties. Transactions T escr(A,T ) and T puzzle were timelocked for 10 blocks and T escr(T ,B) was timelocked for 15 blocks. All escrow transactions T escr(A,T ) are funded by TXID and all escrow transactions T escr(T ,B) are funded by TXID. Two payerpayee pairs completed the protocol successfully. For the remaining three pairs, some player aborted the protocol: Case 1: The Tumbler T (or, equivalently, Alice A 1 ) refused to cooperate after the Escrow Phase. Alice A 1 8 This test, all escrow transactions T escr(A,T ) and T cash(T ,B) had the same timelock tw 2 and T puzzle had a timelock of tw 1 , where tw 1 < tw 2 . Also, we also modify the protocol description in in Step (2) of Section V-D to have both A and T sign T puzzle during the Payment Phase without posting it to the blockchain. (We can do this because Alice is only making a single payment in this epoch (i.e., Q = 1).) Then, if a malicious Tumbler tried to from steal bitcoins (per the 'Tumbler is corrupt' case of Section VII-B), A could protect herself by posting T puzzle to the blockchain, and reclaim the bitcoins locked in T puzzle after its timelock tw 1 expires, but prior to tw 2.
9 For instance, in a 24 hour window starting on Aug 12 2016, all 188K transactions with a fee ≥ 41 Satoshi/Byte were confirmed in the next block. A precise model of current Bitcoin miner behavior, under different fees rates and transaction volumes, remains an open research question. [42] analyzes transaction priority and fee rates but uses older data which no longer reflects current trends. reclaims her bitcoins from escrow transaction T escr(A,T ) via a refund transaction after the timelock expires. T escr(A,T ) was timelocked for 10 blocks, and the refund transaction was confirmed 8 blocks after T escr(A,T ) was confirmed. The Tumbler T reclaims its bitcoins from his payment channel with Bob B 1 escrow transaction T escr(T ,B) via a refund transaction after the timelock expires. T escr(T ,B) was timelocked for 15 blocks, and the refund transaction was confirmed 25 blocks after T escr(T ,B) was confirmed.
Case 2: The Tumbler aborts the puzzle-solver protocol by posting the transaction T puzzle but refusing to provide the transaction T solve . (Per Section V-D, to meet the condition in T puzzle and claim its bitcoins, the Tumbler T has to post T solve that reveal a set of preimages. Because the Tumbler refuses to post T solve , thus refusing to solve Alice's puzzle, Alice's bitcoins are locked in T puzzle until its timelock expires.) No payment completes from A 2 to B 2 . Instead, A 2 reclaims her bitcoin from T puzzle via a refund transaction after the timelock in T puzzle expires. The refund transaction was confirmed 4 blocks after T puzzle was confirmed. Tumbler reclaims its bitcoins from its payment channel with Bob B 2 via a refund transaction after the timelock on the escrow transaction T escr(T ,B) expires. The refund transaction was confirmed 25 blocks after T escr(T ,B) was confirmed.
Case 3:
The Tumbler provides Alice A 3 the solution to her puzzle in the puzzle-solver protocol, and the Tumbler has an T puzzle signed by A (Section V-D). However, Alice refuses to sign the cash-out transaction T cash(A,T ) to pay out from her escrow with the Tumbler. Then, the Tumbler signs and posts the transaction T puzzle and its fulfilling transaction T solve and claims its bitcoin. Payment from A 3 to B 3 completes but the Tumbler has to pay more in transaction fees. This is because the Tumbler has to post both transactions T puzzle and T solve , rather than just T cash(A,T ) ; see Table IV .
Remark: Anonymity when players are uncooperative. Notice that in Case 1 and Case 2, the protocol aborted without completing payment from Alice to Bob. kanonymity for this TumbleBit run was therefore k = 3. By aborting, the Tumbler T learns that payers A 1 , A 2 were trying to pay payees B 1 , B 2 . However, anonymity of A 1 , A 2 , B 1 , B 2 remains unharmed, since B 1 and B 2 were using ephemeral Bitcoin addresses they now discard to safeguard their anonymity (see Section IV-A).
[ 
APPENDIX
A. Puzzle-Promise Protocol: Extending to Q payments.
We now extend the puzzle-promise protocol between Bob B and Tumbler T from its "base case' 'of allowing a single payment of denomination 1 bitcoin (Figure 3 ) to allowing Q payments of denomination 1 bitcoin. The extended protocol is in Figure 5 . The extended protocol combines some new cryptographic techniques with the ideas we used in Section III-B (to extend the A-to-T puzzle-solver protocol to handle Q payments.
The extended puzzle-promise protocol produces Q puzzles z 1 , ..., z Q for Bob B, where the solution to the j th puzzle allows Bob to "open" a promise c j . The promise c j contains the Tumbler's ECDSA signature on cash-out transaction T cash(T ,B) (j) that allocates j bitcoins to Bob and Q − j bitcoins for the Tumbler. Each transaction T cash(T ,B) (j) for j = 1, ..., Q points to the same 2-of-2 escrow transaction T escr(T ,B) where the Tumbler escrowed Q bitcoins during the Escrow Phase. During the Payment Phase, Bob B asks the j th payer to solve puzzle z j ; this puzzle solution "opens" promise c j and provides Bob with the Tumbler's signature on transaction T cash(T ,B) (j). As in Section III-B, Bob does not sign this transaction T cash(T ,B) (j) and also does not post it to the blockchain during the Payment Phase. Instead, Bob waits until the Escrow Phase starts, and then signs and posts the single cash-out transaction allows him to claim the maximum number of bitcoins, i.e., the T cash(T ,B) (j) for the last payment Bob received during the Payment Phase.
How do we ensure that Bob B can open the promise c j (and thus obtain T cash(T ,B) (j)) only after he has opened all prior promises c j−1 , ..., c 1 ? (This is crucial, because otherwise a cheating Bob claim Q bitcoins from his very first payment, by asking his first payee for the solution to puzzle z Q . )
We solve this problem by requiring that the solutions to all of the puzzle z 1 , ..., z j be used to open the j th promise c j . To do this, we repeat the steps of the puzzlepromise protocol Q times in parallel. We refer to the Q parallel executions as Q levels. In the j-th level, B prepares η + µ transactions T cash(T ,B) (j), each of which transfers j bitcoins to B. Let z j, denote a puzzle and its solution j, at level j, and let ∈ [η + µ] denote the index for the cut-and-choose as in the base puzzle-promise protocol in Section VI-A. The promise is encrypted under the j puzzle solutions 1, ... j, as:
where σ j, is the Tumbler's signature on the cash-out transaction T cash(T ,B) (j) that allocates j bitcoins to Bob. Now that we have Q levels, we need to extend the cut-and-choose to check the behavior of Tumbler across all Q levels. Recall that for the base case of 1 bitcoin, B prepares η + µ transactions (η of which are fake) of 1 bitcoin each, each of which will be evaluated by T to obtain a η + µ puzzle-promise pairs. (See Step 5 in Figure 3 .) We can visualize this as a 1 × (η + µ) vector, among which B will check the column positions ∈ F that correspond to fake values (Step 8 in Figure 3) . Now, for the case of Q bitcoins, instead of having a 1×(η+µ) vector, we have a matrix of Q×(η+µ) elements (Step 5 in Figure 3) . B still checks the same column positions i ∈ F , but instead of checking a single puzzle-promise pair (c , z ), B will check a column of Q puzzle-promise pairs [ (c 1, , z 1, ) , . . . , (c Q, , z Q, )] (Step 8 in Figure 5 ).
Finally, recall that in the base case, B additionally checks that the full level of puzzles z l1 , . . . , z lµ is consistent with the quotients q 1 , . . . , q µ (Step 10 in Figure 3 ). Similarly, in the case of Q bitcoins, B will obtain one set of quotient chain for each of the Q levels. Bob checks each level individually (Step 10 in Figure 5 ) to ensure that by solving puzzle z j for level j, Bob can also solve all puzzles z j,l1 , . . . , z j,lµ for level j.
Security. The prove security for this protocol, we extend the definition of the ideal functionality F promise-sign in Section D to the case of Q payments. At high level, this extended definition has the following additional goal: to make sure that Bob B cannot cheat by claiming more than j bitcoins using his j th puzzle solution. That is, a real puzzle-promise pair (c j, , z j, ) for level j must contain a signature on a cash-out transaction that transfers exactly j bitcoins to Bob, and no more. Our extended ideal functionality F promise-sign enforces this as follows: When Bob B submits a request to receive the promise of a signature on a real message, then the ideal functionality F promise-sign checks that the real messages confirms to a correct format-namely, that for the j th level it confirms to the format CashOutFormat(j) which transfers exactly j bitcoins to Bob-before sending it off to T . Thus, the security of our protocol follows from the theorem below, which is proved in Appendix G: 
pk mod N Abort if any check fails.
11. Post transaction T escr(T ,B) on blockchain 12. Begin Payment Phase. For j ∈ [Q], the j th puzzle is zj = z j, 1 Fig. 5 . Puzzle promise protocol that allows Bob B to obtain up to Q payments. (sk , (pk , N )) are the RSA keys for the tumbler T . (Sig, ECDSA-Ver) is an ECDSA-Secp256k1 signature scheme. We model H, H and H shk as random oracles. In our implementation, H is HMAC-SHA256 (keyed with salt), H is 'Hash256', i.e., SHA-256 cascaded with itself, which is the hash function used in Bitcoin's "hash-and-sign" paradigm with ECDSA-Secp256k1. CashOutFormat(j) is shorthand for the unsigned portion of a transaction that fulfills T escr(T ,B) and transfers j bitcoins to B and Q − j bitcoins to T . The protocol appends a random pad to CashOutTFormat. FakeFormat is a distinguishable string known to all parties.
Theorem 3: Let λ be the security parameter. If RSA trapdoor function is hard in Z * N , if H, H , H shk are independent random oracles, if ECDSA is strong existentially unforgeable signature scheme, then the puzzle-promise protocol in Figure 5 securely realizes the extended F promise-sign functionality for the case of Q payments. The security for T is 1 − ν(λ) while security for B is 1 −
B. Ideal Functionalities
We analyze each of the fair-exchange protocols used in TumbleBit in isolation. For each protocol, we identify the security (fairness) properties that we require for the players involved in that phase.
In the Escrow Phase, we consider only interactions between players B and T in the puzzle-promise protocol (Section VI-A). We identify the functionality and the security requirements that we expect by this interaction and we formally capture them through and ideal functionality F promise-sign that we describe in the details in Section D.
In the Payment Phase, we consider only interactions between players A and T in the puzzle-solver protocol (Section V-B). We capture the functionality and security requirements of this interaction in the ideal functionality F fair-RSA described in Section C.
We follow the standard ideal/real world paradigm. To prove that a protocol π securely realizes an ideal functionality F, one must show that the view obtained by a real world adversary Adv, corrupting either one of the parties, and running protocol π, can be simulated by a PPT simulator S that only has access to the interface of F. Let us denote by view π,Adv real the view that the adversary Adv, corrupting party P i and playing protocol π, with party P j , playing with input x j . Let us denote by view F ,Adv ideal the view generated by simulator S, interacting with F and having black-box access to Adv. Security is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Secure realization of F.): A twoparty protocol π securely realizes F if, for every PPT static and malicious adversary Adv corrupting either party P 1 or party P 2 , there exists a PPT Simulator S such that the view view The Random Oracle Model [8] . Our security proofs are in the Random Oracle (RO) model [8] ; hash functions are modeled as perfectly random functions, and in the security proof the simulator can program their answers.
C. Ideal functionality F fair-RSA
The puzzle-solver protocol allows Alice A to obtain the solution to a single RSA-puzzle y (chosen by A), from the Tumbler T (who posses the RSA secret key sk ), in exchange for a bitcoin. Fair exchange for this Parties. A, T , and adversary S. Setup. On receiving (Setup, (pk , sk )) from T . If KeyVer(pk , sk ) = 0 then do nothing. Else, send (Setup, pk ) to A and S.
Evaluation.
On input (request, sid, y, 1BT C) from A: If y is in the range of f RSA , send (request, sid, A, y) to T . Start counter tw sid = 0.
If tw sid = tw , send (refund,sid, 1BTC) to A. protocol entails the following: (1) Fairness for T : After one execution of the protocol A will learn the correct solution y sk mod N to at most one puzzle y of her choice. (2) Fairness for A: T will earn 1 bitcoin iff A obtains a correct solution.
We model the above two requirements with an ideal functionality, that we call F fair-RSA , shown in Figure 6 . F fair-RSA is a trusted party between A and T . F fair-RSA receives a puzzle-solving request of the form (y, 1 bitcoin) from A, and forwards the request to T . If T agrees to solve the puzzle y for A, then T receives 1 bitcoin while A receives the puzzle solution. Otherwise, if T refuses, A will get 1 bitcoin back, and T gets nothing. Fairness for T is captured because A can request a puzzle solution only if she sends 1 bitcoin to F fair-RSA . Fairness for B is captured because T receives 1 bitcoin only if he agrees to reveal the puzzle solution. Remark 1. Note that A can always learn solution to RSA puzzles that she generates herself without interacting with F fair-RSA . That is, A can always choose a random x ∈ Z * N and generate the puzzle y = x pk mod N ; in this case, she trivially knows the puzzle solution is x. This is not a problem because TumbleBit requires Alice A to solve puzzles that were provided to her by Bob B, and generated through Bob B's interaction with T during the puzzle-promise protocol.
Remark 2. Note that the functionality F fair-RSA does not provide any privacy for A. Indeed, T learns A's puzzle y even if T refuses to solve the puzzle. To use F fair-RSA in our unlinkable TumbleBit scheme, users will have to first blind their inputs to F fair-RSA .
Functionality F promise-sign The functionality is parameterized by a format specification FakeFormat, and parameters µ and η.
Parties. B, T , and adversary S.
Setup. Inform F promise-sign if T is corrupt or honest.
Key Generation. Upon receiving message (KeyGen, B) from party B, send it to S and receive response (PK eph T , Sig). Sig is a signing algorithm. Send (Setup, PK eph T ) to B and record the pair (PK eph T , Sig).
Signature Request. Upon receiving this message from B: Promise. Upon receiving (promise, B, ANS, Set) from T . If ANS = NO, then set all signatures to ⊥. Else, if Set = ∅, compute signatures as follows:
Send (Sign, FkTxni, B) to adversary S, and obtain respective signatures. 
D. Ideal functionality F promise-sign
The security requirements for the puzzle-promise protocol (Figure 3) , which is run in the Escrow Phase of TumbleBit, are captured by an ideal functionality F promise-sign that we describe in Figure 7 .
F promise-sign acts a trusted party between B and T . Bob B sends the "real" and "fake" transactions to F promise-sign . F promise-sign has access to an oracle that can compute the Tumbler's T signatures on any messages. F promise-sign is designed to guarantee the following two properties:
(1) Fairness for B: If T agrees to complete the protocol, then Bob B obtains at least one promise that contains a valid signature on a real transaction. This property follows because F promise-sign has access to an oracle that computes the T 's signature. Specifically, upon receipt of a real message m j from B, functionality F promise-sign keeps a record (m j , PK eph T , promise) that promises to return a valid signature on m j to B. Importantly, however, F promise-sign does not reveal the actual signature on m j , but only a promise that this signature will be revealed in the future.
(2) Fairness for T : Bob B learns nothing except signatures on fake transactions. This property follows for three reasons. First, F promise-sign will only ask its signing oracle to sign fake transaction, i.e., to sign messages that conform to the fake transaction format 'FakeFormat'. Second, when F promise-sign is asked to verify signatures, only signatures computed on fake transactions will be valid and all others will be invalid. This follows because the only signatures F promise-sign considers to be valid are those that had previously been computed by its signing oracle. Third, F promise-sign does not reveal the actual signature on a real message m j , but only a promise that the signature will be revealed in the future.
Discussion. In the ideal world, S will be the signing oracle for F promise-sign . This is follows the definition of the ideal functionality for signatures, per [15] . We stress that this does not mean that S has an additional power. The reason being that in the ideal world, the only signatures that are verified by F promise-sign are the ones on fake messages. Thus, towards ensuring indistinguishability between the real world and ideal world, we just need to make sure that (when T is honest), no party can (in both the ideal and real world) produce a signature on a real message without breaking unforgeability of the signature scheme.
F promise-sign and the case of Q payments. For the case of Q payments, we provide an extended version of the F promise-sign functionality that deals with Q sets of signatures. The main modification that we need to make-beside having F promise-sign provide Q sets of fake signatures rather than one set-is to additionally check the format of real messages. We therefore extend F promise-sign with parameters Q and RealFormat(·), and a validation test that checks that any real message m j,i sent for the j-th set, complies with format RealFormat(j). This is important because in our application we need to control the type of messages that B gets signed. In our application, RealFormat(j) = CashOutFormat(j).
Concretely, we extend Figure 7 as follows. First, F promise-sign is parameterized by two format specifications: FakeFormat and RealFormat, and 3 parameters Q, µ and η. Second, in the Signature Request step B one of the following tuples for every j ∈ [Q]:
In other words, B sends a Q×µ-matrix of fake messages FkTxn j,i and a Q×µ-matrix of real messages m j,i . The ideal functionality will additionally check that:
Then, when T chooses the Set ⊂ [µ] in the Promise step, then index i ∈ Set means that B is promised that m j, will be signed for every j ∈ [Q]. In other words, if column index i is in Set, it follows that signatures are promised for the entire column of real messages m j,i ∀j ∈ [Q].
E. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is divided into two cases.
1) Case:
A is corrupted: We start with intuition, and then present the formal proof.
Intuition. We want to prove that, by participating in (and arbitrarily deviating from) the protocol in Figure 2 , any corrupted A does not learn anything more than the solution x to the puzzle y, i.e., A learns only the RSA pre-image x = f −1 (y, sk ) = y sk . The transcript obtained by A in the protocol executions contains: (1) pre-images for all the fake values β i with i ∈ F , that is f −1 (β i , sk ); (2) encryptions c i of the pre-images of all "real" β i and hash h i of the keys used to encrypt these c i . Informally, such transcript does not leak any information to A for the following reasons: 1) A learns nothing from the answers to the fake set: For all β i in the fake set F , A must provide the pre-images f −1 (β i , ·) to T before T decrypts c i . Therefore, A does not learn anything new from T 's decryptions. 2) For the real β i , A is computationally-bound to a single puzzle y because in A must provide values r 1 , . . . , r n that demonstrate that, for all i, 10 Equivocable means that the encryptions can be later decrypted by S as any value, by programming the output of the random oracle.
Overview of proof. Formally, we shall prove this by showing that there exists a PPT simulator S that is able to simulate the transcript between A and T , having in input only the puzzle solution f −1 (y, sk ) = y sk . If this is possible, it means that the transcript reveals nothing more than the puzzle solution y sk to A.
We heavily use the programmability of the RO. In a nutshell, the S computes all ciphertexts using random values (instead of by encrypting the actual values) and will later ensure that they decrypt to the correct values by programming the random oracle (RO). The key observation is that, at any point in the protocol, T "decrypts" his encryptions only after A has sent some crucial information. Indeed, T sees the pre-images (i.e., ρ i ) of the fake set before he sends the keys to decrypt his ciphertext. This allows the simulator to learn how to program the RO to decrypt the ciphertext with the values ρ i that A reveals. Similarly, S learns the original puzzle y in the second phase of the protocol, and S will query the ideal functionality F fair-RSA with (y, 1btc) to obtain the puzzle solution x = y sk . Finally, S will program the RO so that he can equivocate the remaining ciphertexts so that they decrypt to the correct puzzle solution x.
Proof. The formal proof consists of two steps. First, we describe the simulator S, then we prove that the transcript generated by S is indistinguishable from the transcript generated in the real world execution. Let Adv denote the adversary corrupting player A.
Simulator S. S internally runs adversary Adv. Let session identifier be sid. Let Q H be the set of queries made to the H random oracle, and Q H prg be the queries made to the H prg random oracle. 1) Setup. Extract (pk , sk ) from proof π published by Adv. Send (Setup, (pk , sk )) to F fair-RSA . 2) Upon receiving β 1 , . . . , β m+n from Adv; randomly pick c i in {0, 1} λ and h i ∈ {0, 1} λ2 for i ∈ [m + n] and send it to Adv. 3) Upon receiving F and ρ i for i ∈ F , check if β i = (ρ i ) pk mod N, ∀i. If check fails, output whatever Adv outputs and halt. Else, run procedure Equivocate(c i , ρ i , h i ) to obtains keys k i . Send k i for i ∈ F to Adv. 4) Upon receiving y, r i for i ∈ R from Adv. If β i = y · (r i ) pk mod N for all i ∈ R and transaction T puzzle is correctly formed, do as follows: − Send (request,sid, y, 1btc) to F fair-RSA and obtain x = y sk mod N . − Run Equivocate(c i , x · r i ,h i ) and obtain k i with i ∈ R. − Send transaction T solve with values k i . Else, checks have failed so output whatever Adv outputs and halt.
Procedure RO: Random Oracle Simulation for H, H prg proceeds as follows. Upon receiving query q for H (resp., H prg ):
1) if query q ∈ Q H (resp., Q H prg ), retrieve entry (q, a) from the set and output a. 2) Else pick a random a ∈ {0, 1} λ2 (resp. λ 1 ), add (q, a) to Q H (resp., Q H prg ) and output a.
Procedure Equivocate(c i , m i , h i ) is as follows:
Indistinguishability proof.
We prove by hybrid arguments that view view Adv,T (T , sk ) obtained by Adv interacting with T playing with secret input sk is indistinguishable from the view S interacting with F fair-RSA . are independent random oracles. Then, the view generated by S is computationally indistinguishable from the view view Adv,T (T , sk ) obtained by Adv in the real world.
Proof: We use a hybrid argument.
H 0 : This is the real game. The transcript is generated precisely using the procedure of T with secret input sk . The view generated in this hybrid experiment is view Adv (T , sk ). sk , h i ). Note that, in this hybrid we are still using sk (which S does not know), but we are programming the answers to the RO. The difference between H 0 and H 1 is in the way keys k i are computed.
Due to the security properties assumed in the RO, the values c i , h i statistically hide the message encrypted and the hash-preimage; and probability of event Collision is negligible. Therefore, the view generated in hybrid H 0 is statistically indistinguishable from the view generated in H 1 .
This hybrid experiment is exactly as H 1 with the only difference that procedure Equivocate is run with input Equivocate(c i , ρ i , h i ) where ρ i is taken directly from the transcript, and Equivocate(c i , y sk · r i , h i ). where y sk is taken from F fair-RSA only after Adv hast send T puzzle . The view generated in this hybrid experiment is identical to view generated hybrid H 1 , and correspond to the simulation strategy S.Note that in this hybrid argument the entire view is generated only with a single evaluation y sk .
2) Case: Tumbler T is corrupted: We want to show that any adversary Adv corrupting T will earn 1 bitcoin if and only if she provides a correct solution to A's puzzle. This follows from the following arguments.
Define BAD the following event: (1) T passes the Fake Set Check (Step 7 in Figure 2 ), therefore providing n correct decryptions to c i for i ∈ F , AND (2) all encryptions c i in the real set i ∈ R are incorrect, i.e., do not decrypt to a valid puzzle solution.
Given that (1) permuted β 1 , . . . , β m+n information theoretically do not reveal any information about sets F, R and (2) H, H prg are modeled as random oracles, then the probability of event BAD amounts to the probability of guessing set F , which is
Simulator S. Suppose Adv corrupts Tumbler T . S internally runs Adv. S, playing in the ideal world, receives (request, sid, y, 1 bitcoin) from F fair-RSA . Using input y, S simulates the transcript that Adv expects to see in the real world, by honestly following A's procedure on input y. Upon receiving {k i } for all i ∈ F from Adv, S checks if all {c i } i∈F are correct. If so, S sends message (evaluate,sid, A) to F fair-RSA which then passes the puzzle solution x to the ideal world player A. Meanwhile, S sends T puzzle to Adv. Upon receiving T solve from Adv: if all keys {k i } for all i ∈ R decrypt ciphertexts c i that do not contain valid puzzle solutions, then S outputs BAD and aborts. Else, S outputs whatever Adv outputs and halts.
Indistinguishability Proof.
Real world and ideal world execution are distinguishable only in the case that "BAD" event happens. To see why, note that, when S outputs "BAD" it means that in the ideal world S sent message (evaluate,sid, A) to F fair-RSA , so that ideal player A receives her output. However, in the real world, A will not get any valid output. So the two worlds will be distinguishable. The two worlds are therefore distinguishable with probability Pr[BAD].
F. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we provide the formal proof of Theorem 2. We prove that the puzzle-promise protocol in Figure 3 securely realizes functionality F promise-sign (Figure 7) in the random oracle model.
The proof consists of analyzing two cases: (1) Case B is corrupted, where we argue that any malicious B * does not learn anything besides signatures of fake transactions; (2) Case T is corrupted, where we argue that, if the protocol successfully terminates, then B will be able to retrieve a signature (on a real cashout transaction T cash (T ,B) ) from a puzzle-promise pair (c i , z i ) for some i ∈ R. 1) Case B is corrupted: The proof consists of showing that for any corrupted B * there exists a PPT simulator S that corrupts B in the ideal world, and can generate the entire view of B * while having access only to the information provided by the ideal functionality F promise-sign . Recall that, in the ideal world, Bob B only receives signatures for the fake messages. With only this information in hand, S will have to simulate the view that the real world adversary B * has during its interaction with T . The idea is that, if we can prove that the transcript generated by S is indistinguishable from the one generated by T , then it follows that any B * learns no more that what B learns from F promise-sign .
We stress that the following analysis only consider the puzzle-promise protocol run during the Escrow Phase. The analysis works in the stand-alone setting, where no other protocol, except the puzzle-promise protocol is executed.
We start with the intuition behind the proof.
Proof Intuition. We have to prove that the transcript of the protocol between B * and T , reveals nothing more than signatures on fake messages, i.e., σ = Sig(SK eph T , β ) for ∈ F ; and a "promise" of at least one valid signatures on a real messages β i for i ∈ R. In the real world, the promise is the set of puzzle-promise pairs (c i , z i ) for i ∈ R, where c i is an encryption of a valid signatures on β i , and z i is an RSA puzzle whose solution can be used to decrypt c i . The point of the proof is to show that B learns nothing else beyond the guarantee that for i ∈ R there is at least one pair (c i , z i ) that has an encryption of a valid ECDSA signatures on a real message β i .
We prove this by showing that if (1) the encryption scheme is perfectly secure in the RO model, and (2) that RSA trapdoor function is hard to invert, then the transcript obtained by B from the interaction with T reveals nothing but the signatures on fake messages. We will show that the entire transcript can be simulated by a simulator S that only gets the signatures on fake messages as input.
To build intuition, we list the information that B * obtains from the transcript, and we explain why it gives no information on the signatures of valid messages. B * obtains the following values:
1. Encryptions (c 1 , . . . , c µ+η ) computed as a one-time pad of the output of the Random Oracle H shk queried with secret values 1 , . . . , µ+η .
As we work in the (programmable) random oracle, we assume that each encryption perfectly hides the message. Also, the simulator can equivocate each decryption, by programming the random oracle. This means that, encryptions c i alone do not reveal any information to B * ; indeed the simulator S could generate such c i by just sending a random value. Here we are using the unpredictability property of the RO, as well its programmability.
RSA puzzles
(z 1 , . . . , z µ+η ) where z i = F fair-RSA ( i , pk , N ). Recall that each i is randomly chosen group element, and that RSA parameters are computed using the correct procedure. Therefore, under the assumption that RSA trapdoor function is hard in the group determined by the chosen parameters, a PPT B * cannot learn any i from z i . (q 2 , ..., q µ ) , where q j = j i j i−1 for j i ∈ R. This is a sequence of connected divisions of the secret keys j1 , . . . , jµ . Intuitively, to see that these quotients do not give any more information than what can be learnt from values z j1 , . . . , z jµ , we show that one can compute z ji and q ji that pass the "quotient test", without knowing any ji .
Quotients
To see why, note that the quotient test checks that for each each i = 2, ..., µ,
where R = {j 1 , ..., j µ }. This means that one can fix arbitrary z ji , q ji ∈ Z * N and compute z ji−1 as z ji /(q ji ) pk . In this way one can generate z ji , q ji that pass the test without knowing the RSA inverse of any of the z ji . This observation will be crucial in the proof, because it allows us to show that if there is an adversary B * that is able to learn some ji for j i ∈ R, then we can build a reduction A RSA that can solve an RSA puzzle z * . Looking ahead, in order to carry out the reduction, we need to make sure that adversary A RSA can identify the set R in advance, so that he can place his challenge value as z * = z ji for some j i in the real set. To achieve this, we exploit the observability of the RO. Namely, the reduction A RSA can obtain the set F and R by observing the RO queries made by B * to obtain the values h R and h F .
Formal Proof. The formal proof consists of two steps. First we show a PPT simulator S generates a simulated transcript for B * , by using only the information that B would get in the ideal world (that is, only signatures of fake values obtained through interaction with F promise-sign ). S exploits the extractability/programmability properties of the RO. Second, we prove that the view generated by the simulator S in the ideal world is computationally indistinguishable from the transcript in the real world.
Simulator S. S, interacting with F promise-sign , internally runs adversary B * and simulates the messages that B * expects from T as follows. 
, do the following:
). If ANS = NO, then halt and output whatever B * outputs.
Store in Q H shk the pair ( j ,hj ). 5) Send i for i ∈ F and quotients q j1 , . . . , q jµ .
(C) Finally, output whatever B * outputs and halt.
Procedure RO1: Random Oracle simulation for H proceeds as follows. Upon receiving query γ for H: 
pk = (z i ) for some i ∈ R and no pair (γ, a) has been recorded yet in Q H shk , then output RSA failure. 3) Else, pick a random a ∈ {0, 1} λ2 . Add tuple (γ, a) to Q H shk . 4) Output a.
Indistinguishability Proof.
We now show that the transcript generated by S is indistinguishable from the transcript generated by T in the real world. This is done via a sequence of hybrid experiments. We start with the real world transcript, hybrid H 0 , where the transcript of the protocol is computed following algorithm T (Figure 3) . Then, in a sequence of hybrid experiments we change the way we compute the values β i , c i , z i , q i until we reach the final hybrid experiment where all values are computed following the algorithm S defined above.
H 0 . This is the real world. The transcript is computed according to Protocol in Figure 3 . Namely, the simulator follows exactly the same steps as the Tumbler T .
H 0.5 (Learn R, F using observability of RO). In this hybrid experiment the simulator uses the observability of the RO H during the protocol execution. Namely, upon receiving message (h F , h R , β i ) from B * , we extract the queries (salt||F, h F ) and (salt||R, h R ) made to Q H to identify the real and fake sets R, F . If no such query is found, but later B * sends a well formed message, the simulator aborts.
The difference between the distribution of the transcript obtained in H 0 and that in H 0.5 is that the simulator aborts in H 0.5 if the RO H was not queried when forming h R , h R ). The probability of aborting corresponds to the probability of correctly guessing the output of H. As H is modeled as a RO, this probability amounts to 1/2
λ2
. Therefore experiments H 0 and H 0.5 are statistically close.
H 1 (Equivocate encryptions using programmability of RO). In this hybrid we change the way encryptions c i are computed. Instead of computing
In H 1 , the simulator sets c i H 2 (Change computation of values for real set R using RSA security). In this hybrid the simulator computes z ji , q i for i ∈ R, following the algorithm S described above. The differences are the following. For j i ∈ R, in H 1 we have that
while in H 2 we have that
Note that in H 2 , ji is neither computed nor stored in Q H shk . Thus, H 2 is different from H 1 because in H 2 procedure RO2 can trigger a RSA failure event and abort. (Because the RSA failure event happens when B * queries oracle Q H shk with the pre-image of a real puzzle z ji , it follows that the probability of an abort in H 2 is related to the probability of B * of (RSA)-inverting z ji for some j i ∈ R.) Therefore, to argue that H 1 and H 2 are computationally indistinguishable, we need to show that the distinguishing event -event RSA failurehappens only with probability that is negligible in λ. Proof: We can construct a reduction Adv RSA to the hardness of RSA trapdoor function using an adversary B * that causes hybrid H 2 to abort due to an RSA failure event.
Adv RSA plays the RSA game, receiving values pk , z * from a challenger. The goal of Adv RSA is to output a the pre-image x = (z * ) sk with non-negligible probability.
Meanwhile, the reduction's high-level goal is to place the challenge value z * among the values z j1 , . . . , z jµ with j i ∈ R. Because B * causes hybrid H 2 to abort due to RSA failure event, there exists some i such that B * queries H shk with ji = (z ji ) sk , with non-negligible probability. Thus, if Adv RSA places z * in position j i , then Adv RSA wins the game with the same probability (discounted by a 1/µ polynomial factor of guessing j i correctly). The crux of the reduction is to show how Adv RSA generates the entire transcript for B * -and in particular the quotients q 2 , . . . , q µ -without knowing the the pre-image of z ji . To do this, we have Adv RSA generate all z j for j ∈ R, without knowing their pre-image.
Reduction Adv RSA . Adv RSA receives (pk , z * ) from the RSA challenger. Adv RSA chooses ECDSA ephemeral key (SK eph T , PK eph T ). Adv RSA activates B * on input (pk , PK eph T ) and follow procedure run in H 2 by computing (z ji , q i ) as follows. Adv RSA first randomly picks an index j i ∈ R and sets z ji = z * . Then she chooses values q j1 , . . . , q jµ and remaining z j1 , . . . , z jµ as follows. 1) For values preceding z ji (i.e., for 0 < < i), pick q +1 ∈ Z * N ; compute z = z +1
(q +1 ) pk . 2) For values following z ji (i.e., for i < ≤ µ), pick q ∈ Z * N ; compute z = (q ) pk · z −1
If event RSA failure occurs, then procedure RO2 has observed an RSA pre-image some some z i . If z i = z * then Adv RSA outputs it and win the game. Else, she halts. Summing up, in hybrid H 2 , tuples ( i , c i ⊕ σ i ) for all i ∈ R are not recorded in Q H shk . In other words, neither i , nor the signature σ i for real messages m i with i ∈ R are computed in this hybrid.
H 3 (Obtaining signatures from F promise-sign .) In this hybrid experiment the signatures σ i for i ∈ F are computed using F promise-sign . That is, S sends F promise-sign the message (sign-request, B, PK eph T , {FakeFormat||r i } i∈F , {m j } j∈R ) If ANS =yes, S uses answers σ i = FkSign i to set
's the point of view, hybrid H 2 and H 3 are identical. Experiment H 3 thus corresponds to the exact simulation strategy S described above. This conclude the proof.
In the above proof we have shown that any PPT B * does not learn anything from the transcript obtained in Protocol in Figure 3 . We now show that if B * does indeed output a valid signature σ * for a valid message T cash(T ,B) , then B * (who is not getting any information from the transcript), must have produced a signature forgery. Define event E forge as the event where, a PPT B * runs the protocol in Figure 3 and outputs a pair (T cash (T ,B) , σ) where T cash(T ,B) is a real message rather than a fake message (i.e., T cash(T ,B) is a valid cashout transaction for T cash(T ,B) that does not conform to FakeFormat). We now prove the following.
Lemma 3:
If ECDSA is an existentially unforgeable signature scheme, P r[E forge ] is negligible.
Proof:
We can construct an adversary Adv ecdsa that forges a signature on a new message T escr(T ,B) i using adversary B * .
Adv ecdsa plays the signature game and has oracle access to the signing algorithm O, and has verification key PK eph T . The goal of Adv ecdsa is to use B * to produce a signatures σ * on a message that was never queried to O. Adv ecdsa simulates the interaction between B and T using algorithm S. Recall that S obtains the signatures by interacting with the ideal functionality F promise-sign and, in particular, S only queries F promise-sign for signatures on fake messages, i.e., , with messages in f k i ∈ FakeFormat. Thus, the reduction Adv ecdsa will simply run S's algorithm, and when S queries F promise-sign , Adv ecdsa will use its access to O to generate the correct signatures. It follows from the previous hybrid arguments that B * cannot distinguish whether she is talking to T or S. Therefore, the probability of B * generating a forgery when interacting with T is close (up to a negligible factor) to the probability of B * generating a forgery when interacting with S and therefore Adv ecdsa .
If B * outputs the pair (σ, m), and m / ∈ FakeFormat, then Adv ecdsa has obtained her forgery (σ, m). Thus, P r[E forge ] = P r[E forge−ECDSA ] − ν(λ). Which is negligible assuming EDCSA signature scheme is secure.
2) T is corrupted:
We now show that the view of any corrupted T * , playing with an honest B, can be simulated by a simulator S T that only has access to the ideal functionality F promise-sign .
Proof Intuition. In the ideal world, T needs to decide whether to grant signatures to B (that is, set ANS to yes or no, and the indexes in Set) in a committing manner: if ANS =yes then T has no power to prevent B from getting the promised signatures later. This is because ideal functionality F promise-sign has access to the algorithm Sig, and when ANS =yes the ideal functionality proceeds with the computation of the required signatures for the fake messages, and has the ability to sign the real messages in the future. Now, the goal of the simulator S T , is twofold: (1) To decide whether T should set ANS to yes or no, and to choose Set in the ideal world. (2) To correctly compute the signatures requested by F promise-sign via Sig. To this end, S T will do as follows. S T interacts with real world T * , and if T * provides an accepting transcript, then S T will play ANS =yes. Then, by using the observability of the RO H shk , S T will extract the signatures σ i for i ∈ F ∪ Set and uses these signatures to produce the output of the signing algorithm Sig.
At high-level, a bad case for the simulator S T is when (1) the transcript is accepting 11 and S T sent promise 'ANS =yes, Set' to F promise-sign , but (2) the real T * did not make RO queries that allow S T to recover σ i from c i for all i ∈ F ∪ Set. That is, the bad case happens when the promise is fulfilled in the ideal world, but not in the real world.
Thus, the crux of the proof is to show that the probability of the bad event is negligible if T * provides an accepting transcript. That is, when the transcript is accepting and S T plays ANS =yes in the ideal world, also real world B is guaranteed that will receive the promised signature. At a high level, this holds due to the following reasons.
1. Fake-Set Test. Due to the perfect hiding of the RO, sets F and R are information theoretically hidden for T * . Thus the probability that T * successfully passes the cut-and-choose phase, (i.e., the Fake Set Check in Figure 3 ) and that there is no i ∈ R such that (c i , z i ) is correctly formed, corresponds to the probability of correctly guessing the set F . This happens with probability:
2. Quotient Test. The quotients q 2 , . . . , q µ guarantees that knowledge of j1 = (z j1 ) sk for j 1 ∈ R, allows B to learn all remaining keys j2 , . . . , jµ . To see why, notice that if T * passes the Quotient Test, it means that for each i, z ji = q i · z ji−1 . Thus unlocking z j1 recovers j1 that in turns unlocks z j2 which recovers j2 and so on. Therefore, even if only one ciphertext c ji contains a valid signature, B will be able to decrypt c ji and recover that signature.
Formal proof. We now proceed with the formal argument. We present the simulator S T , the algorithm Sig (which is part of F promise-sign , see Figure 7 ), and finally argue that the transcript generated by the simulator in the ideal world is indistinguishable from that in the real world.
Simulator S. S runs T * internally. 11 A transcript is accepting if the honest player B completes the protocol without aborting. checks, add i to set Set, and add (β i , σ i ) to L real . If no such i exists, set real = no. (Note that, for the real set, it is sufficient that one a single l , with l ∈ R is correct. This is because the quotient chain guarantees that knowledge of j1 allows B to obtain all ji for j i ∈ R.)
For all i ∈ F , pick randomness r i , and send it T * . Add pair (FkTxn i ||r i , β i ) to Q H .
Upon receiving the 'openings' i to fake messages i ∈ F , use i to obtain σ i from c i . If any (i, c i , z i , i , β i , σ i ) fails any validity check, send (promise, B, N O, ⊥) to F promise-sign . Else, if all checks pass, send (promise, B, yes, Set).
Now we have two cases:
Case 1: Suppose there exists i ∈ F such that tuple (i, i , β i , σ i ) passes all validity checks but (·, β i , σ i ) is not recorded in L f ake . Then, abort and output binding-fail!.
Case 2:
Otherwise, for all i ∈ F , we have that (i, i , β i , σ i ) pass all validity tests and (·, β i , σ i ) is recorded in L f ake .
1) If real
= no, abort and output cut-and-choose-fail!. 2) Else, set variables L f ake and L real for algorithm Sig.
Algorithm Sig(m i , PK eph T ). Internal variable L f ake and L real . If there is tuple (m i , β i , σ i ) in L f ake , output signature (β i , σ i ). Else if there is tuple (β i , σ i ) in L real , then add tuple (m i , β) to Q H , and output signature (β i , σ i ). Else, abort.
Indistinguishability Proof. The protocol messages generated by S T interacting with T * are distributed identically to the transcript produced by a real B. The only difference between the distribution of the output of the real and ideal world is that the simulator aborts more often. Thus, proving indistinguishability between the two distributions, amounts to proving that events binding-fail! and cut-and-choose-fail! happen with negligible probability.
Let us look at each event, and argue why they occur with negligible probability Event cut-and-choose-fail! This event happens when the transcript is accepting and all the fake values are computed correctly, but all the real values are incorrect (i.e., S T set real = no). Namely cut − and − choose − fail! happens when: 1) For all i ∈ F , T * provides consistent responses i , which were queried to H shk . 2) For all j ∈ R, there exists no j ∈ Q H shk that can be used to decrypt c j to a valid signature σ j on β j .
By the hiding of H, H , probability of cut − and − choose − fail! corresponds to the probability that T * guesses the set F which is: finds two i , i such that z i = i and z i = i . Due to the fact that RSA is a permutation and that B checks that i < N , the latter event happens with probability 0. Due to the onewayness of the random oracle, the first event happens when T * guesses the output of H, which happens with negligible probability 1/2
